What happens if there is a nuclear explosion

A nuclear blast is different than a dirty bomb. A dirty bomb, or radiological dispersion device, is a bomb that uses conventional explosives such as dynamite to spread radioactive materials in the form of powder or pellets. It does not involve the splitting of atoms to produce the tremendous force and destruction of a nuclear blast, but rather spreads smaller amounts radioactive material into the surrounding area.

The main purpose of a dirty bomb is to frighten people and contaminate buildings or land with radioactive material. While a serious event such as a plane crash into a nuclear power plant could result in a release of radioactive material into the air, a nuclear power plant would not explode like a nuclear weapon.

There may be a radiation danger in the surrounding areas, depending on the type of incident, the amount of radiation released, and the current weather patterns. However, radiation would be monitored to determine the potential danger, and people in the local area would be evacuated or advised on how to protect themselves.

Local emergency management officials will tell people when to take KI. If a nuclear incident occurs, officials will have to find out which radioactive substances are present before recommending that people take KI. If radioactive iodine is not present, then taking KI will not protect people.

Taking KI will not protect people from other radioactive substances that may be present along with the radioactive iodine. Skip directly to site content Skip directly to page options Skip directly to A-Z link. Radiation Emergencies.

Section Navigation. Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Syndicate. Minus Related Pages. What is a nuclear blast? What are the effects of a nuclear blast? How can I protect my family and myself during a nuclear blast? Following are some steps recommended by the World Health Organization if a nuclear blast occurs: If you are near the blast when it occurs: Turn away and close and cover your eyes to prevent damage to your sight.

Drop to the ground face down and place your hands under your body. However, in the case of smaller weapons, direct radiation may be the lethal effect with the greatest range. Direct radiation did substantial damage to the residents of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Human response to ionizing radiation is subject to great scientific uncertainty and intense controversy. It seems likely that even small doses of radiation do some harm. Fallout radiation is received from particles that are made radioactive by the effects of the explosion, and subsequently distributed at varying distances from the site of the blast.

While any nuclear explosion in the atmosphere produces some fallout, the fallout is far greater if the burst is on the surface, or at least low enough for the firebalI to touch the ground. The significant hazards come from particles scooped up from the ground and irradiated by the nuclear explosion. The radioactive particles that rise only a short distance those in the "stem" of the familiar mushroom cloud will fall back to earth within a matter of minutes, landing close to the center of the explosion.

Such particles are unlikely to cause many deaths, because they will fall in areas where most people have already been killed. However, the radioactivity will complicate efforts at rescue or eventual reconstruction.

The radioactive particles that rise higher will be carried some distance by the wind before returning to Earth, and hence the area and intensity of the fallout is strongly influenced by local weather conditions.

Much of the material is simply blown downwind in a long plume. Rainfall also can have a significant influence on the ways in which radiation from smaller weapons is deposited, since rain will carry contaminated particles to the ground.

The areas receiving such contaminated rainfall would become "hot spots," with greater radiation intensity than their surroundings.

Ground Zero The term "ground zero" refers to the point on the earth's surface immediately below or above the point of detonation. Note that these estimates do not include the effects of precipitation, which would wash out and concentrate fallout in particular areas which may or may not be populated. The committee expects that including the effects of precipitation would make the weather-related variability in the estimated number of casualties significantly greater than is suggested by this analysis.

Of course, as mentioned frequently, Figure 6. In the case of Target A, for example, the 50 percent confidence interval for deaths due to acute effects of fallout based solely on variability in wind direction is , to ,; that is, there is a 75 percent chance of exceeding , deaths from acute effects of fallout, and a 25 percent chance of more than , deaths. The 50 percent confidence interval for total fatalities is considerably narrower: 1. If the detonation is moved 30 kilometers northwest of Target A, the confidence intervals are much wider: 13, to , for deaths from acute.

For Target B, the corresponding intervals are 9, to 40, for deaths from acute effects of fallout; 10, to 60, for deaths from latent effects from fallout; and 20, to 90, for total fatalities. Although the committee has not done a comprehensive analysis of the effect of wind direction for a wide range of yields, it is apparent that the casualty-reduction factor the ratio of number of casualties for a surface burst to that for an EPW with a yield 25 times smaller could be considerably lower or higher than the mean ratios given in Figure 6.

For example, Figures 6. Total fatalities are 10 to 40 times higher for the surface burst for Target A, depending on wind direction, with a mean 20 times higher.

For Target B, the fatality ratio varies from 4 to 40, with a mean of 16; for comparison, the mean casualty ratio given in Figure 6. The model runs show significant fatalities from both an EPW and a surface-burst weapon. The numbers are larger when the attack is near a population center and if a wind that would blow the fallout into the population center is introduced in the calculations. It is also worth noting, however, that with unfavorable winds the lower-yield EPW would cause about as many deaths as would the higher-yield surface burst with favorable winds.

For example, 40, deaths result from attacks on Target A from the 10 kiloton EPW with the wind blowing from the west and the kiloton surface burst with the wind blowing from the east. Similarly, 15, deaths result from attacks on Target B from the 10 kiloton EPW with the wind blowing from the southeast and the kiloton surface burst with the wind blowing from the northwest.

These numbers suggest that wind direction can be as important as a fold difference in yield in determining civilian casualties from attacks in which fallout is the primary health hazard. These comparisons indicate the sensitivity to wind of collateral damage to populations.

However, an unfavorable wind for an EPW is, of course, also an unfavorable wind for a surface burst; the same is true for favorable winds. A population center downwind of either weapon is an unfavorable situation.

As noted above, the estimates produced by DTRA and LLNL of the numbers of deaths and injuries due to fallout include only the external gamma-ray dose from the deposition of fallout particles on ground surfaces.

The contribution of these exposure pathways to the acute radiation dose usually is not substantial and would not significantly alter the estimates presented above. Under some conditions, however, the contribution of other exposure pathways to the risk of latent cancer could be significant.

Here the contribution of these other exposure pathways is reviewed in a semiquantitative manner. For underground, surface, or near-surface nuclear explosions, the radioactive fallout is mixed with a large mass of ejecta in the main cloud or base surge. These clouds are dense, and most of the mass at. Thus, most of the external dose received by persons within several kilometers of the detonation point is due to radiation from the deposited material rather than from the airborne cloud itself.

Also, at close-in distances, cloud passage occurs during a rather short period of time; this is another reason that the integrated exposure from cloud passage tends to be small relative to the long-term exposure from radionuclides deposited on the ground.

During the s when atmospheric nuclear testing was conducted at the Nevada Test Site NTS , there were a number of sets of measurements of the rate of exposure before, during, and after the passage of clouds from a variety of types of nuclear tests. In general, the radiation dose received from the passage of the cloud itself is not a significant fraction of the dose received as a result of total external exposure.

In addition to external exposure, individuals may also be exposed to radiation by inhalation of fallout particles, either during the passage of the cloud or subsequently owing to resuspension of deposited particles by wind, plowing, vehicle travel, or other disturbances of the surface.

Based on measured external gamma-radiation exposure rates and air concentrations observed downwind of explosions at the NTS, the whole-body inhalation dose was calculated to have ranged for most organs from 1 to 20 percent of the dose that resulted from the ingestion of contaminated food.

This larger dose is due to the entrance during cloud passage of large particles into the upper respiratory tract, from which the particles are coughed up and swallowed. The inhalation of resuspended radionuclides is a pathway of interest under only a few special circumstances—primarily with respect to the inhalation of radionuclides that do not cross biological barriers easily but can be retained over very long periods if inhaled. The most notable example of such a radionuclide is plutonium.

If a nuclear device performs correctly, plutonium has not been found to be a significant source of radiation dose. In general, inhalation is not very significant compared with other pathways of exposure. Consideration of this pathway would not significantly increase the casualty estimates presented above. The consumption of contaminated water has not been found to be a significant exposure pathway following nuclear tests at the NTS. Although deposition on water surfaces does occur, it has not been a significant source of exposure because dilution is rapid for persons living downwind of the NTS.

The aquatic pathway was of greater concern following the Chernobyl accident, which contaminated one of the watersheds supplying water to the Kyiv Reservoir. Even in this situation, however, the consumption of contaminated water was not a substantial pathway. Contamination of some lake systems following the Chernobyl accident in locations as far away as Sweden and Norway was more of a problem for lakes having a large surface area, shallow depth, and limited inflow and outflow.

In this case the direct consumption of water was not of interest; rather, the fish in such locations were found to have elevated levels of cesium It is doubtful that a similar situation would occur following a nuclear explosion, as the amounts of long-lived radionuclides created.

The consumption of food contaminated by fallout from a nuclear test, however, has proven to be a major problem both at the NTS 20 , 21 and the Semipalatinsk Polygon, a nuclear test site in the Soviet Union. By far the largest concern has been associated with iodine, which has a half-life of 8 days.

It is by the combination of several fairly unique circumstances that this radionuclide has been the major radionuclide of concern from the viewpoint of food contamination for both nuclear weapons tests and for reactor accidents.

Substantial amounts of I activity are created by nuclear explosions; this radionuclide is also volatile and does not condense on particles until late, at which time it becomes associated with the surfaces of fallout particles. The smaller particles are also preferentially retained by vegetation, 24 from which they are lost with a half-retention time of about 10 days. A milk cow, if it is receiving its full quota of food from fresh pasture, will consume per day the amount of I that is contained on about 50 square meters, 25 and it will secrete up to 1 percent of that daily intake into a liter of milk.

The thyroid is a very small gland, weighing about 20 grams in adults and only about 2 grams in infants. Thus, iodine is preferentially retained on vegetation, which the cow efficiently samples and rapidly secretes into milk; an infant then concentrates a large fraction of that iodine in milk into an extremely small gland, thus producing a relatively large dose. Goats are also of more concern; they graze less territory, but they secrete about 10 times more of their daily intake of iodine into 1 liter of milk.

For nuclear explosions outside the United States, the consumption of milk from other animals, such as sheep, horses, and camels, should be considered. The milk-transfer factors for these animals are not well known.

Scientists at the National Cancer Institute are conducting a research program to determine such factors, but the results are not yet published. For a hypothetical device with approximately 50 percent fission fraction, i. These results are scaled from published calculations made for NTS shots. Other radionuclides of concern in terms of contaminated foods are 89 Sr, 90 Sr, and Cs.

These share the characteristics of high fission yield the fraction of fissions that produce the radionuclide or its precursors , volatility of the radionuclide or its precursors , and efficient secretion into milk. Other organs of concern are the digestive tract, red bone marrow, and bone surfaces.

So far, it has been assumed for this discussion that the persons and the milk animals are collocated. This is frequently not the case. Reconstruction of thyroid dose from past events has included elaborate attempts to reconstruct sources of milk or movement of milk from one region to another. It is important to note that this pathway, consumption of contaminated food, can be relatively more important for fallout from nuclear explosion accidents in nonurban areas in the sense that milk animals are more likely to be located in rural areas.

The problem of contaminated milk supplies following a. Such elimination of this pathway would require that local inhabitants were adequately warned; that sufficient monitoring devices, iodine supplies, and distribution systems were available; and that alternate food supplies were available. Contamination of other types of food crops would also occur. After milk, the food of most concern is fresh, leafy vegetables. Such vegetables are efficient in capturing fallout and are typically consumed fresh on a daily basis during the growing season.

This practice provides an opportunity for a direct and rapid pathway to humans following deposition of fallout but, again, this pathway can be eliminated by an informed population with an adequate infrastructure. Other types of food crops typically have less ability to capture fallout or have more indirect and longer pathways to humans. The longer pathways allow for both radioactive decay and the loss of retained material from the crops.

Pathways of possible concern include the consumption of meat from grazing animals, poultry, and eggs. Grain crops are not usually of concern unless they are harvested immediately after deposition of fallout. The consumption of contaminated food is unlikely to result in any acute health effects, but it could in some circumstances increase significantly the number of latent cancers that would be expected in the affected population.

An accurate estimate of the number of latent cancer fatalities from this exposure pathway would require estimating the amount of contamination in milk and various other foods, the consumption of these foods by the population, the internal dose from each radionuclide to each organ, and the use of organ-specific risk coefficients.

The computer codes used for this study do not consider deposition at very great distances. If clouds are lofted to substantial heights and later encounter precipitation systems, there can be areas of enhanced deposition very far away.

This deposition was eventually detected only after contaminated straw used in the packing of x-ray film was noted to have exposed the film. Of more recent interest were the areas of enhanced deposition that resulted from the Chernobyl accident. Contamination was sufficiently high in areas of several countries far from the accident e. Such fallout returns to Earth slowly, and with a half-time of about 1 year, most of the short-lived radionuclides would have decayed before the fallout returned to Earth.

It takes a large explosion to produce such injections, on the order of hundreds of kilotons. Much of the experience with global fallout resulted from the large tests conducted by the United States and the Soviet Union from to , although earlier large tests in , , , and also produced global fallout. Concern was largely focused on 90 Sr and Cs, each of which has a half-life of about 30 years. Under unusual circumstances, such as the large-scale subsidence of air masses or the penetration of large thunderstorms into the stratosphere, the deposition of I was also noted.

The health effects resulting from attacks with conventional weapons on nuclear-weapon storage facilities depend on the detailed design of the nuclear weapons being attacked. Because the design details of enemy nuclear weapons are unknown and could not be discussed in this document in any case , the committee cannot provide quantitative estimates.

The greatest such risks would arise from weapons containing plutonium. Even in this case, however, the dispersal of plutonium from tens of weapons would be unlikely to cause deaths or acute illnesses in civilian populations. Dispersal of plutonium could, however, result in thousands of latent cancer deaths if kilogram quantities of plutonium aerosol were dispersed in densely populated areas.

In this case, the effects on nearby civilian population would be similar to those estimated in Figure 6. It seems probable that even an early-stage nuclear country or group would desire some degree of safety in order to preserve both the weapon and the nuclear material for the use for which it was intended. Consequently, other techniques will likely be employed to create safe operating conditions for the weapons. For example, the weapon components can be kept in separate locations, ready to be assembled quickly for possible use as was done with a number of U.

There may also be mechanical safety devices in place that lead to a low probability of unintentional detonation even if not as quantitative as the one-point safety criterion. As a result, the probability of significant nuclear yield from a conventional attack is quite low—but cannot be completely ruled out. A study suggests that waiting an hour after fallout arrives to move to a better location that's within 15 minutes can be a smart idea in limited situations. Buddemeier is a fan of the phrase " go in, stay in, tune in ": Get to your fallout shelter, stay in for 12 to 24 hours, and tune in with a radio, phone, or other device for official instructions on when to evacuate and what route to take to avoid fallout.

There are many more strategies to increase your chances of survival. Having basic emergency supplies in kits at home, at work, and in your car will help you prepare for and respond to any disaster , let alone a radiological one. For preventing exposure to fallout after a blast, tape plastic over entryways or broken windows at your shelter and turn off any cooling or heating systems that draw in outside air.

Drinking bottled water and prepackaged food is also a good idea. And if you've been exposed to fallout, there's a process to remove that radioactive contamination:. Potassium iodide pills , while often billed as anti-radiation drugs, are anything but fallout cure-alls. Buddemeier estimates that radioiodine is just 0. The government will provide them for free if they're needed, according to the Food and Drug Administration. The single most important thing to remember if a nuclear bomb is supposed to explode, he says, is to shelter in place.

They just happened to be in there. And what major injuries they received were from flying glass. For you. World globe An icon of the world globe, indicating different international options. Get the Insider App. Click here to learn more. A leading-edge research firm focused on digital transformation. Good Subscriber Account active since Shortcuts. Account icon An icon in the shape of a person's head and shoulders. It often indicates a user profile.